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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Jason Zane Garner appeals from the district court’s order revoking his probation 
and executing his aggregate underlying unified sentence of ten years, with six years 
fixed.  On appeal, Garner contends that, pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f), a district court cannot 
revoke probation unless it finds a willful probation violation.  Garner further argues there 
was insufficient evidence that he willfully violated his probation and, even if the evidence 
was sufficient, the district court erred in revoking his probation.     
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
In Docket No. 43493 (Canyon County Case No. CR-2014-11002), a grand jury 
indicted Garner for first degree felony stalking.  (R., pp.8-12.)  In Docket No. 43494 
(Canyon County Case No. CR-2014-11016), the state charged Garner with three counts 
of felony possession of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver, possession of a firearm and/or deadly weapon during the 
commission of a crime, and unlawful possession of a firearm.  (R., pp.92-99.)       
As part of a global plea agreement, Garner pled guilty to felony stalking in Docket 
No. 43493, and in Docket No. 43494, Garner pled guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver and one count of possession of a controlled substance.  
(R., pp.113-114.)  The court imposed a unified five-year sentence, with three years fixed 
on all three charges; however, the sentences on the two possession charges were 
ordered to run concurrent with each other, but consecutive to the sentence imposed on 




cases and, at the conclusion of the jurisdictional review period, the court placed Garner 
on probation.  (R., pp.35-40, 136-138, 151-153.)   
Just over four months after the court placed Garner on probation, his probation 
officer filed an Agent’s Warrant of Arrest in both cases.  (R., pp.43, 155.)  The state 
subsequently filed a Petition for Probation Violation in both cases alleging Garner 
violated his probation by leaving the district without permission and by violating the 
condition that he follow his probation officer’s instructions, which included that he not 
have contact with the victim in the stalking case.1  (R., pp.52-56, 158-162.)      
Following an evidentiary hearing on the probation violation allegations, the district 
court found that Garner violated his probation in both cases.  (See generally 7/29/2015 
Tr.)  The court thereafter revoked Garner’s probation in Docket Nos. 43493 and 43494 
and ordered his sentences executed.  (R., pp.58-59 (Docket No. 43493); 178-179 
(Docket No. 43494).)  Garner timely appealed from the judgments revoking his 
probation.  (R., pp.60-62 (Docket No. 43493), 180-182 (Docket No. 43494).) 
 
                                            
1 In Docket No. 43493, the state initially filed a Petition for Probation Violation on June 
2, 2015, with a Report of Probation Violation dated May 29, 2015, which alleged Garner 
violated his probation, in part, by violating condition number six from the probation 
order, which read:  “The defendant shall abide by the No Contact Order entered in this 
matter.”  (R., pp.45-47.)  Three days later, the state filed a Petition for Probation 
Violation in the same case with a Report of Probation Violation dated June 4, 2015, 
which alleged a violation based on Garner’s failure to follow the probation officer’s 
instruction “not to have contact with the victims in his stalking case,” instead of a 
violation of condition number six.  (R., pp.52-55.)  The June 4, 2015 Report of Probation 
Violation was also the basis for the Petition for Probation Violation filed in Docket No. 
43494, and it appears that report was the subject of the evidentiary hearing.  (Compare 





Garner states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err by revoking Mr. Garner’s probation and executing 
his underlying aggregate sentence of ten years, with six years fixed? 
 
(Revised Appellant’s Brief (“Appellant’s Brief”), p.3.) 
 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Should the Idaho Supreme Court retain this case to decide whether I.C.R. 
33(f) supplants the standards for revoking probation set forth in I.C. §§ 20-222, 19-2602, 
and 19-2603 such that a defendant’s probation may only be revoked if the district court 
finds a willful probation violation?2   
 
2. Has Garner failed to show there was insufficient evidence to support the 
district court’s finding that he violated his probation or that the district court abused its 
discretion in revoking Garner’s probation? 
 
                                            






I.C.R. 33(f) Does Not Control A District Court’s Authority To Revoke Probation And 
Garner Has Failed To Show, Under The Applicable Legal Standards, That The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion By Finding He Violated His Probation Or By Revoking His 




 The terms of Garner’s probation included that he not leave the Third Judicial 
District without permission from his probation officer and that he follow his probation 
officer’s instructions, which included that he not have contact with the victims in his 
stalking case.  (R., pp.54-55, 160-161.)  Following an evidentiary hearing, the district 
court found that Garner violated both of these conditions.  (7/29/2015 Tr., p.59, L.14 – 
p.63, L.22.)  The court subsequently revoked Garner’s probation in Docket Nos. 43493 
and 43494 and ordered his underlying sentences executed.  (8/6/2015 Tr., p.17, Ls.19-
21; R., pp.58-59, 178-179.)   
On appeal, Garner contends that, pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f), the district court could 
not revoke his probation absent a finding that the violation was willful.  (Appellant’s 
Brief, p.4.)  Garner also challenges the district court’s “factual finding that he violated 
the terms of his probation,” and “its decision to revoke his probation.”  (Appellant’s Brief, 
p.4.)  All of Garner’s arguments fail.  The statutes applicable to probation revocation 
control a district court’s revocation decision and do not require a willful violation as a 
predicate to revocation.  Further, application of the correct legal standards to the 
evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing supports the district court’s finding that 





B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The decision to revoke a defendant’s probation on a suspended sentence is one 
within the discretion of the sentencing court.”  State v. Lee, 116 Idaho 38, 39, 773 P.2d 
655, 656 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing I.C. § 20-222).  When a trial court’s discretionary 
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to 
determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the bounds of such discretion and 
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) 
whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.  State v. Ruperd, 
146 Idaho 742, 743, 202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
“The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by analogy, 
court rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free review.”  Hansen 
v. State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 
C. The District Court Acted Consistently With Governing Legal Standards In 
Revoking Garner’s Probation Upon Finding That He Violated The Conditions 
Thereof, Regardless Of Whether The Violation Was Willful 
 
Garner contends I.C.R. 33(f) precludes a district court from revoking probation in 
the absence of a willful violation and he “challenges both the district court’s factual 
finding that he violated the terms of his probation and its decision to revoke his 





1. I.C.R. 33(f) Does Not Control A District Court’s Authority To Revoke 
Probation; Rather, The Applicable Statutes Allow A District Court To Revoke 
Probation Even If The Violation That Forms The Basis Of The Revocation 
Decision Is Not Willful 
   
Garner’s challenge to the district court’s finding that he violated his probation is 
premised on the assertion that, under I.C.R. 33(f), the district court cannot revoke 
probation unless it finds the probation violation was willful.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.4)  This 
argument is contrary to the applicable statutes that govern the revocation of probation.  
The authority of a trial court to revoke probation is governed by several statutes.  
Among them, Idaho Code § 20-222 provides: 
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court 
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or 
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested.  
Thereupon, the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation 
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be 
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may 
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which 
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.  In making a 
determination to continue or revoke probation and suspension of 
sentence, the court shall consider the defendant’s risks and needs and 
options for treatment in the community.   
 
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court may revoke a defendant’s 
probation when the defendant has violated “any of the conditions of probation.”  I.C. 
§ 20-222 (emphasis added).  Nowhere in this statute is there a requirement that the 
violation be “willful.”  Rather, the only limitation on the court’s authority to revoke 
probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be a violation of one or more 
conditions of probation and the court must “consider the defendant’s risks and needs 
and options for treatment in the community.”   
 Idaho Code §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603 similarly grant trial courts broad authority to 




probation does not even depend upon [a] violation of any of the terms or conditions of 
the order.”  Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 482, 253 P.2d 794, 798 (1953), quoted in 
Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 297, 392 P.2d 552, 554 (1964). Idaho Code § 19-2602 
authorizes a district court to “issue a bench warrant for the rearrest of the defendant” 
either where “it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the terms and conditions 
upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the court or any of them have 
been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court.”  (Emphasis added.)  
“When the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of 
probation,” Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that the court “may, if judgment has been 
withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if 
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation.”   
 Consistent with the plain language of I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222, 
Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized that the trial courts of this state have statutory 
authority to revoke probation in two circumstances:  “(1) [upon] satisfactory proof of a 
violation of a probation condition, or (2) [for] ‘any other cause satisfactory to the court.’”  
State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (citing I.C. §§ 19-2602 
and 20-222), quoted in State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 326, 824 P.2d 899, 900 (Ct. App. 
1991); see also Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554; Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 
at 482, 253 P.2d at 798-99; State v. Hancock, 111 Idaho 835, 727 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 
1986).  It is true that Idaho’s appellate courts have held that a trial court must consider 
alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant’s probation based on a 
violation that was “not willful, or was beyond the probationer’s control.”  State v. 




relevant statutes (or in the case law to this point) actually prevents a trial court from 
revoking probation where the violation or other “cause satisfactory to the court” was not 
willful. 
Without even mentioning the statutes that govern a trial court’s authority to 
revoke probation, Garner argues on appeal that the district court lacked authority to 
revoke his probation because Rule 33(f) of the Idaho Criminal Rules states that a “court 
shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the defendant or a finding by 
the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated a condition of 
probation." (Appellant’s Brief, p.4.)  The state acknowledges that the plain language of 
this rule purports to divest trial courts of authority to revoke probation unless the 
defendant admits, or the court finds, that the defendant “willfully violated a condition of 
probation.”  I.C.R. 33(f).  The requirement of the rule that there be a willful probation 
violation before a court may revoke probation is of no effect, however, because it 
directly conflicts with the broad authority to revoke probation granted by I.C. §§ 19-
2602, 19-2603 and 20-222, and because a court’s authority to revoke probation is a 
matter of substantive, not procedural, law. 
  “When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no 
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way 
that results in a conflict.”  State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706, 709, 228 P.3d 387, 
390 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916 
(2008)).  In this case, it simply is not possible to reasonably interpret I.C.R. 33(f) in a 
way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222.  Pursuant to the 




condition of probation.”  I.C.R. 33(f).  The statutes, on the other hand, give the court 
broad authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of “any” of the probation 
conditions or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court.”  I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 
20-222.   
Because it is not possible to reconcile the rule and the statutes, “this Court must 
determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance.”  Johnson, 145 
Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; see also State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 540-41, 700 
P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 391.  “Substantive 
law issues are the province of the legislature, while matters of rulemaking and 
procedure are generally the province of the judiciary.”  Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 
P.3d at 390 (citing Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; State v. Yoder, 96 
Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 774 (1975)).  Thus, if the conflict between a statute and 
a criminal rule relates to matters of procedure, the criminal rule will prevail.  Johnson, 
145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (citing State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 
891, 892 (1992)); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390.  “Conversely, in matters 
of substantive law, the statute applies.”  Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709-10, 228 P.3d at 
390-91 (citing Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893).   
 In determining whether a conflict relates to matters of substantive law or, instead, 
to matters of procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the following general 
guidelines: 
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and punishments 
for violations thereof.  It thus creates, defines, and regulates primary 
rights.  In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the essentially 
mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and 





Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674, 
676-77 (Wash. 1974)); accord Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93; 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 710, 228 P.3d at 
391.   
Applying these guidelines in Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that 
any conflict between I.C.R. 7(b) – which requires a charging document to allege the 
“essential facts constituting the offense charged” – and I.C. § 19-1430 – which 
abolished the distinction between accessories and principals such that “no other facts 
need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required in an 
indictment against his principal” – was a matter of substantive law.  Johnson, 145 Idaho 
at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17.  Specifically, the Court explained: 
The Legislature’s definition of principal and abolishment of the distinction 
between principal and accessories does not pertain to mechanical 
operations of the courts; the Legislature is creating, defining, and 
regulating primary rights.  Thus, I.C. § 19-1430 is substantive and does 
not overlap with this Court’s power to create procedural rules.  Therefore, 
even if I.C. § 19-1430 and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would 
prevail. 
 
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. 
 Similarly, in Beam, supra, the Court held that a statute requiring a defendant in a 
death penalty case to file a challenge to his sentence within 42 days prevailed over 
I.C.R. 35, which permits a challenge to an illegal sentence at any time.  Beam, 121 
Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893.  The Court reasoned that, given the unique nature of the 
death penalty, the statute “creates, defines, and regulates primary rights” and, as such, 




 Like the statutes at issue in Johnson and Beam, the statutes granting a trial 
court’s authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any of the conditions of 
probation or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court” are substantive in nature.  It 
is well-settled that probation, itself, “is not a matter of right; it may be granted the 
defendant through exercise of sound discretion by the trial court within the ambit of 
authority conferred by the legislature.”  Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554.  
Because a trial court’s power to place a defendant on probation only exists as a function 
of the legislature’s power to enact substantive law, it follows that a court’s authority to 
revoke probation is likewise a matter exclusively within the province of the legislature.  
See id. at 300-01, 392 P.2d at 557 (citations omitted) (“The legislatures of the several 
states have the exclusive and inherent power to define, prohibit and punish any act as a 
crime within the limits of the federal and respective state constitutions.”).  Indeed, a 
review of Idaho Code §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 shows they do not merely 
prescribe the mechanical procedure a court must follow in revoking probation.  Instead, 
they actually define and regulate the circumstances under which a legislatively 
authorized grant of probation may be revoked.   
Because the authority of a court to revoke probation is a matter of substantive 
law, the statutes granting the trial courts of this state that authority must “‘be given due 
deference and respect.’”  Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (quoting In re 
SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995)).  Accordingly, 
to the extent I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest trial courts of the authority granted to them 
by the legislature to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any probation 




Garner’s argument that the district court could not revoke his probation without finding 
he willfully violated the conditions of his probation is without merit. 
 
2. Under The Correct Legal Standards, Garner Has Failed To Show The District 
Court Erred In Finding Garner Violated His Probation Or Abused Its 
Discretion In Revoking His Probation 
 
“In reviewing a probation revocation proceeding, [this Court] use[s] a two-step 
analysis.”  Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citing State v. Knutsen, 138 
Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003)).  The first step “ask[s] whether the 
defendant violated the terms of his probation.”  Id.  “For the first step, a district court’s 
finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence 
in the record to support the finding.”  Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 
(citations omitted).  “In the event of conflicting evidence, [this Court] will defer to the 
district court’s determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses.”  Id.  If the Court 
determines the defendant did violate his probation, the second step asks “what should 
be the consequences of that violation.”  Id. (citing Knutsen, 138 Idaho at 923, 71 P.3d at 
1070).  “A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal 
absent a showing that the district court abused its discretion.”  Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 
105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citing State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 381 P.2d 1337, 1340 
(Ct. App. 1994)).     
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding 
that Garner violated his probation by failing to follow his probation officer’s instruction 
that he not have contact with the victims in his stalking case, and Garner has failed to 




One of the conditions of probation in both of Garner’s cases was that he “follow 
[the] advice and instructions of the supervising officer,” which included that he was “not 
to have contact with the victims in his stalking case.”  (R., pp.54-55, 160-161.)  Both 
cases also had a condition of probation that Garner “not leave the State or Third Judicial 
district (Adams, Gem, Canyon, Owyhee, Payette, and Washington counties) without first 
obtaining written permission from the supervising officer.”  (R., pp.54, 160.)  The basis 
of the state’s Petition for Probation Violation in both of Garner’s cases was his failure to 
abide by these two conditions.  (R., pp.52-55, 158-161.)  The evidence the state 
presented at the evidentiary hearing to support these allegations included the testimony 
of Garner’s probation officer, Betsy Owen, one of his stalking victims, Sarah Estep, and 
Officer Donald Peck.   (See generally 7/29/2015 Tr., pp.14-58.)   
Probation Officer Owen testified that (1) she was responsible for supervising 
Garner on probation (7/29/2015 Tr., p.14, L.25 – p.15, L.2); (2) a term of Garner’s 
probation was that he could not have contact with the victims of his stalking case, 
including Sarah Estep (id. at p.15, Ls.11-17); (3) another term of Garner’s probation was 
that he could not leave the Third Judicial District without her permission (id. at p.15, 
L.25 – p.16, L.4); (4) she received a call from the probation office “from District Four in 
Boise” advising that Garner “was in Boise and was allegedly stalking the victims again” 
(id. at p.17, Ls.2-8); (5) when she asked Garner about being in Boise on May 21, 2015, 
he made different excuses, including that he was “on his way to go fishing” an “had 
stopped to go to an AA meeting” (id. at p.17, L.22 – p.18, L.11); and (6) she had not 




Sarah testified that on May 21, 2015, she saw Garner parked across the street 
from her workplace, which is located in Boise.  (7/29/2015 Tr. p.36, Ls.14-23.)  
Specifically, Sarah testified that, as she was leaving work, Garner “was parked across 
from our parking lot in the Albertsons parking lot.”  (Id. at p.36, L.14 – p.37, L.16.)  
Sarah “immediately grabbed [her] cell phone and took pictures” of Garner’s car and 
called the police once she got home.  (Id. at p.37, L.21 – p.38, L.14.)  Garner was 
parked about 30 yards from where Sarah works.  (Id. at p.39, Ls.1-4.)  Although Garner 
did not try to talk to Sarah, she could see Garner sitting in his truck looking at her in his 
rearview mirror and it “looked like he smiled.”  (Id. at p.41, L.25 – p.42, L.23.)   
Officer Peck testified that he reviewed the photographs Sarah took, and was able 
to see the license plate number on the truck.  (7/29/2015 Tr., p.48, Ls.12-14.)  The 
license plate number for the truck in Sarah’s photographs was registered to Garner.  (Id. 
at p.48, Ls.15-22.)   
A series of text messages retrieved from Garner’s phone was also admitted into 
evidence at the probation violation hearing.  (Exhibits 1, 2.)  Those text messages, 
which were between Garner and someone named “Diamond,” read: 
Fuck my ex just drove by and took a pic of my truck 
Wtf? 
The one that says I’m stalking her 
Stupid. 
I’ll beat her fucking ass 
 
She was in a blue [illegible] van 
Weird 




 Fuck why the fuck 
 My phone is dead 
 
U can say u were looking at some places for rent 
Does she live in Boise? 
Where were u at? 
 
 I was in alberts[ons] parking lot 
 I’m on the street you walk down 
 
(Exhibits 1, 2.)          
 Based on the evidence presented, the district court found Garner violated his 
probation by leaving the district without permission and by having prohibited contact 
with Sarah, the victim in his stalking case, by sitting outside Sarah’s “place of 
employment on or about May 21, 2015.”  (See R., pp.160-161 (handwritten notes 
reflecting court’s findings); 7/29/2015 Tr., p.59, L.14 – p.63, L.22 (oral findings at 
conclusion of evidentiary hearing).)  There was substantial evidence in the record to 
support both of these findings.     
On appeal, Garner does not challenge the district court’s finding that he violated 
his probation by leaving the Third Judicial District; he only challenges the finding that he 
violated his probation by having contact with Sarah.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.10 n.6.)  With 
respect to the latter finding, Garner argues there was “insufficient evidence to establish 
that [he] willfully violated the no contact order and willfully disobeyed the supervising 
officer’s instruction not to contact the victim” (Appellant’s Brief, p.6), which was alleged 
to have occurred when Garner “was in Ada [C]ounty at [Sarah’s] place of employment 
on or about May 21, 2015” (R., pp.55, 161).  Although willfulness is not a prerequisite to 
revocation (see subsection C.1., supra), in this case, the evidence supports a finding 




the victims in his stalking case.3  The evidence showed that Garner was within 30 yards 
of Sarah’s work, sitting in his truck, and looking at Sarah in his rearview mirror.  This 
conduct violated Garner’s probation officer’s instruction that Garner not have contact 
with Sarah, which would include not knowingly remaining within 300 feet of her or her 
workplace.   
Garner’s claim that the evidence was insufficient is based on his assertion that 
he “inadvertently or accidentally went to a grocery store that he did not know was 
across the street from the victim’s work.”  (Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)  That Garner wanted 
the district court to draw this inference does not mean the evidence was insufficient to 
support the district court’s contrary finding.  It is well-settled that a factfinder “may infer 
intent from the defendant’s conduct, or from circumstantial evidence.”  State v. Crowe, 
135 Idaho 43, 47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000) (citations omitted).  Moreover, 
there was no actual evidence that Garner “inadvertently or accidentally” parked across 
the street from Sarah’s workplace and sat in his truck and watched her from his 
rearview mirror.  While it is true, as Garner notes, that he was not required to “disprove 
the State’s allegations” (Appellant’s Brief, p.8), it is equally true that the district court 
was not required to conclude that his behavior was “inadvertent[ ] or accidental[ ]” when 
                                            
3 It appears the parties defined “contact” in relation to the probation officer’s instruction 
as being consistent with the No Contact Order, which precluded Garner from 
“harass[ing], follow[ing], contact[ing], attempt[ing] to contact, communicat[ing] with in 
any form, or knowingly remain[ing] within 300 feet of the victim(s) or his/her property, 
residence, work or school.”  (R., p.19.)  Garner did not dispute this below or on appeal. 




the evidence supported a contrary finding.  Garner has failed to show error in the district 
court’s finding that he violated his probation.4        
At the disposition hearing, the district court5 revoked Garner’s probation in both 
cases and ordered his sentences executed.  (8/6/2015 Tr., p.17, Ls.19-21.)  Garner 
contends the court abused its discretion in doing so because, he argues, he “had a 
serious drug addiction to prescription medications when he began the rider program,” 
but “did very well on the rider” regardless, “had been testing ‘clean for drugs’” since, and 
“was finally able to obtain full-time employment,” “attend[] church,” go to Alcoholics 
Anonymous meetings, and “do the family thing.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12 
(quotations and transcript citations omitted).)  Contrary to Garner’s argument on appeal, 
“these facts” do not show an abuse of discretion by the district court. 
                                            
4 Garner also argues “remand is necessary because the district court did not make a 
finding that the violations were willful, which is explicitly required by I.C.R. 33(f).”  
(Appellant’s Brief, p.10.)  To the extent I.C.R. 33(f) applies, it does not require an 
express finding of willfulness.  Moreover, when a district court finds a defendant violated 
his probation, unless the district court finds otherwise, the presumption is that the 
violation was willful.  See State v. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 844 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(noting the district court “implicitly determined that Peterson’s disregard of the reporting 
obligation was willful”).  Application of this standard is consistent with the general 
principle that even in the absence of express factual findings, the appellate court will 
uphold any implicit findings by the district court that are supported by substantial 
evidence.  See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) (“The 
implicit findings of the trial court, (i.e., that statements of the defendant made to the 
police were voluntary and should not be suppressed) should be overturned only if not 
supported by substantial evidence.”); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 
641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court supported by 
substantial evidence should be given due deference.”).     
 
5 The Honorable Christopher S. Nye sentenced Garner and revoked his probation, but 
the Honorable Dennis E. Goff presided over the evidentiary hearing.  (Compare 




“The applicable legal standard the district court must utilize in determining 
whether to revoke probation is based upon whether the violation was willful or non-
willful.”  Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37; see also State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 
214, 222-223, 322 P.3d 296, 304-305 (2014) (citing Sanchez).  If the probation violation 
was “knowing and intentional,” the district court’s decision to revoke is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion.  Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37 (citing State v. Leach, 
135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)).  If, however, the violation “was 
not willful, or was beyond the probationer’s control, a court may not revoke probation 
and order imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the 
violation.”  Id. (quoting Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d at 713). 
Because Garner’s probation violation was willful, the district court’s decision to 
revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  The district court did not abuse 
its discretion by revoking Garner’s probation in light of Garner’s willful disregard of two 
significant conditions of his probation, one of which included behavior similar to that 
which gave rise to one of his convictions.  (See R., pp.8-9 (allegations in Indictment for 
stalking).)  Garner’s arguments on appeal regarding his performance during the retained 
jurisdiction program, his efforts to address his drug use, and his employment status 
ignore the conduct that gave rise to the probation violations and do not demonstrate an 
abuse of discretion by the district court.   
Garner has failed to meet his burden of showing any error in the district court’s 
finding that he violated his probation and he has failed to show the district court abused 






 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment revoking Garner’s 
probation and ordering his sentences executed in Docket Nos. 43493 and 43494. 
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